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ISSUES BRIEF NO.1

May 2012

A High Stakes Gamble in North Las Vegas
BY ROBERT E. LANG, Ph.D.

Abstract
The City of North Las Vegas, operating in the shadow of the Las Vegas Strip, one of the world’s most
iconic urban settings, faces a series of financial and political challenges that threaten its ability to
perform basic municipal services. This paper explores how North Las Vegas reached the edge of
insolvency, the implications for North Las Vegas and the surrounding municipalities of Las Vegas,
Henderson, and unincorporated Clark County, and the path forward in the face of unprecedented
economic and political turmoil.

The Set Up: How Did North Las Vegas
Reach the Edge of Insolvency?
In my recent book Boomburbs: The Rise of
America’s Accidental Cities, I refer to North
Las Vegas as having a “Rodney Dangerfield
complex,” noting that the city receives little or
no respect as a growing urban center, both
locally and across the nation.1 The remark
refers to the way former North Las Vegas
mayor Michael Montandon was treated by
then mayor of Salt Lake City Rocky Anderson
at a meeting of the National League of Cities.
Montandon approached Anderson to share
his experiences in managing a big city. The
Salt Lake City mayor was incredulous at any
comparison with North Las Vegas. Anderson
implied that he ran a real city and that North
Las Vegas was a suburb. Yet, as I noted in
Boomburbs, North Las Vegas exceeds Salt
Lake City in population—and it also contains
more minorities and foreign born residents
and sustains greater concentrated poverty.
Although seen by some distant observers as a
“suburb,” North Las Vegas maintains a scale
and demographic composition that makes it

essentially urban in character. However,
notwithstanding its urban elements, North
Las Vegas lacks a big city downtown—a
typical condition in most Boomburbs
including Henderson, Nevada.
North Las Vegas may have urban challenges,
but it lacks most urban assets—such as a
large commercial sector—to help mitigate its
fiscal problems. This mismatch between
needs and resources produces a segregated
city with low fiscal capacity. In 2002, Myron
Orfield published Metropolitics for the
Brookings Institution Press, a work that
examined the fiscal capacity for all
jurisdictions in the top 25 U.S. metropolitan
areas.2 While the Las Vegas metropolitan
area was not part of the study, the report’s
findings are highly relevant. Orfield
identified a significant disparity between
jurisdictions in their tax capacity per capita
and the share of dependent residents. Based
on its demographics and modest business
development, North Las Vegas matches
the profile for an “at risk, segregated”
jurisdiction. According to Orfield, such places
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have the lowest “fiscal capacity” and are at
risk for failure and decline.3
Former Mayor Montandon specifically
addressed North Las Vegas’ precarious fiscal
situation in response to observations that
North Las Vegas, once the fastest growing U.S.
city above 100,000 residents, also
experienced notable decline in the areas east
of Interstate 15. Montandon noted that North
Las Vegas was in a race to build out the new
sections of the city with mostly upscale
master planned communities in an effort to
offset the burden of poverty in the older parts
of town. He was also concerned that older
sections of the city were costly to administer
because they were “fee simple” and functions
such as code enforcement were the
responsibility of the city as opposed to the
volunteers that provide this same function in
master planned communities.4
North Las Vegas, like so many
Boomburbs, has both rich and poor
sections. The divide here is I‐15, which
runs north out of Las Vegas and splits the
city in two. The largely built‐out area east
of I‐15 is low income and composes about
a third of North Las Vegas. The still‐
booming space west of I‐15 is higher
income and accounts for about two‐thirds
of the city…New projects approved in the
new parts of North Las Vegas are more
upscale than the existing neighborhoods
in the east. The mayor argues that the
city needs to do this to balance the city’s
income, but the more pressing issue for
Montandon is that North Las Vegas’s east
neighborhoods create enormous costs in
code enforcement. The problem is that
the east side of the city has few
homeowners associations to manage
relations between feuding neighbors and
local government must be brought in to
settle disputes. This requires hiring
municipal employees to do the settling,
and that raises taxes.5
It is important to note that there are
distressed areas in neighboring Las Vegas,
Henderson, and unincorporated Clark County.
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However, the share of such neighborhoods
relative to wealthier sections and business
centers is greater in North Las Vegas,
resulting in less resources and tax capacity
per capita. In the last decade, North Las
Vegas addressed this mismatch via a
“builders’ solution,” where most growth was
concentrated in more affluent master‐
planned communities such as Aliante (a
project that includes housing, retail, and a
Station’s Casino). Yet late in the decade, as
North Las Vegas quickly added middle and
upper income households, the real estate
bubble burst and reversed the growth
pattern.
North Las Vegas soon found itself mired in
the deepest economic downturn since the
Great Depression, and at ground zero for the
nation’s home foreclosure crisis. The once
promising Aliante master planned community
saw its prices fall to below half their 2006
peak and the Station’s Casino file for
bankruptcy in 2009. Overall, the city’s tax
base shriveled as real estate values fell 65
percent from their peak. Again, this occurred
in a city that began the last decade with the
weakest fiscal capacity among all major
metropolitan population centers in southern
Nevada.
Adding to the diminishing reputation of North
Las Vegas are widespread charges of fiscal
mismanagement by city officials. The most
publicized of these charges targets overly
generous contracts with public employees—
especially those in public safety. The charge
has merit. Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce
salary surveys demonstrate that southern
Nevada’s local city and county workers are
among the best compensated public
employees in the country. These surveys
illustrate a regional pattern, suggesting that
while North Las Vegas may be a bit more
generous than most other jurisdictions it is
hardly an outlier. The problem is that North
Las Vegas has the least fiscal capacity to
sustain high wages.
For the region, the state, and the nation,
North Las Vegas is the proverbial “canary in
the coal mine.” The structure of North Las

Vegas government leaves it as the most likely
to fail in the face of a deep recession.
Although nearby jurisdictions also suffered
greatly in the recent Great Recession, they
possessed the capacity to manage fiscal
shortfalls and stay afloat during this long
economic downturn.
Large suburban cities such as North Las
Vegas employ far fewer municipal workers
per capita than comparably sized traditional
cities in the Northeast and Midwest.
Geographic factors contribute to this, as most
Boomburbs lie in the Sunbelt where there is a
tradition of contracting with private firms for
government services. In addition, a large
share of residents in Sunbelt suburban
cities—from Coral Springs, Florida to Irvine,
California—live in master planned
communities that feature private
government. These private governments
substitute for public ones and significantly
reduce municipal tax burdens. Former mayor
Montandon in North Las Vegas intuitively
understood this connection, as he pushed for
all new growth to be located in private
communities. The fact that North Las Vegas
still maintains a large public space east of
Interstate 15 requires a larger municipal staff
than jurisdictions where more people live in
private communities.

The Fallout: What if North Las Vegas
Fails?
North Las Vegas could fail, and in a highly
visible way. The damage, however, would not
be confined solely to that city. The collateral
damage to the cities of Las Vegas and
Henderson, and, most notably, the Las Vegas
Strip, could be significant and lasting. The
first major impact would be the severe
damage to the reputation of the region’s
business climate. For years, Las Vegas
benefited from its national identity as the
fastest growing large U.S. metropolitan area.
Las Vegas was a growth machine—the
newest big metropolis in America.
The Great Recession, and the crushing
collapse of the construction industry and the
home and business foreclosure crisis hit

southern Nevada with unparalleled force.
When the bust came, the national media
descended on Las Vegas to document its
striking reversal of fortune. The once high‐
flying, fun‐loving vacation and convention
destination was brought to its knees by the
downturn. Major projects stalled. City
Center—the largest private development in
U.S. history, located in the center of the Las
Vegas Strip—teetered for a time on the edge
of failure. The tale of riches‐to‐rags decline
spread so far that many foreign news outlets
stationed reporters in Las Vegas waiting for
the next shoe to fall. Few could have
imagined that the press would compare the
region’s decline to that of Detroit. One
academic coined a term for the condition Las
Vegas now experienced. “Sin City” was now a
“Sun Burnt” city as opposed to a Sunbelt city.
In the past year or so the narrative has shifted
as the local and national economy shows
signs of recovery. A new “Las Vegas is Back”
storyline has emerged. Visitor figures
continue to grow, convention business is on
the upswing, and 2012 is expected to be a
record year for tourism.
The economic recovery of the Las Vegas
region remains fragile and subject to instant
revision. The failure of North Las Vegas
would be a visible reminder that the fallout
from the Great Recession continues. A new
“Perhaps Vegas is Not Back” storyline could
emerge and immediately erase months of
accumulating positive news. The failure of
North Las Vegas could become a metaphor for
the diminished opportunities of the region as
a whole. With 226,510 residents, North Las
Vegas is now the third largest city in the state.
It is larger in population than other Western
centers such as Reno, Boise, and Salt Lake
City. North Las Vegas is nearly the size of
Orlando and surpasses such Eastern urban
cores as Birmingham, Alabama; Richmond,
Virginia; and Little Rock, Arkansas.
To date, the biggest U.S. city to flirt with
bankruptcy is Stockton, California, which has
almost 300,000 residents. Stockton lies in a
state with nearly 38 million people. By
contrast, Nevada has just 2.7 million
residents. Only 1 in every 129 Californians
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live in Stockton, while 1 in 12 Nevadans
reside in North Las Vegas. Stockton’s failure
does not equate to California’s failure writ
large. The city is not the third largest in the
state—or even the third largest in the
California’s Central Valley (it is fourth
largest). By contrast, North Las Vegas at the
third rank in Nevada is the equivalent of San
Jose, California.
In short, the failure of North Las Vegas risks
becoming a public relations disaster for the
state. Even the name “North Las Vegas” is
problematic. Many people could mistakenly
assume that Las Vegas is failing—minus the
“north.” The timing is also bad. North Las
Vegas could fail at the very moment that the
state launches its new regional development
authorities. Governor Brain Sandoval is
energetically promoting the launch of this
effort—and the results are all positive.
Reforming Nevada’s economic development
efforts has received popular local and
national media attention. And there are many
more upbeat stories the state could promote.
Some local leaders believe that North Las
Vegas should fail—that the city has it coming
because of its one‐sided contracts with public
employee unions. The State of Nevada,
however, has no provision for a municipal
bankruptcy wherein a city can simply renege
on municipal contracts and start over. The
process of sorting out financial obligations
would be nasty, messy, and very public. The
drama could extend for weeks or even
months. Each story would continue the main
sub‐narrative—failure. North Las Vegas
equals failure, or Las Vegas equals failure, and
even Nevada equals failure. The risks here
are great and the payoff small in that
insolvency does not release the public from
the city’s labor contracts.
North Las Vegas’ financial insolvency also
risks its credit rating. That means the cost of
borrowing would go up as the city’s
municipal bond rating drops and the interest
rates rise. The increased public cost of
infrastructure would put the city at a distinct
competitive disadvantage for attracting new
residents and businesses. At first glance, this
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would seem only a local concern limited to
just one—albeit large—municipality. There
are bigger stakes at play. North Las Vegas
contains just over half of the remaining
developable land in the entire Las Vegas
Valley. By contrast Henderson is nearly “built
out” as its development pushes to the edge of
federal lands. The same is true for much of
the western edge of the region in places such
as Summerlin. In essence, Las Vegas’ future
development lies mostly north, where the last
sections of the region’s beltway are yet to be
finished. Hampering the development of
North Las Vegas by burdening it with a high
cost of borrowing could significantly reduce
the competitive position of the entire Las
Vegas Valley.

The Path Forward: Avoiding a Public
Failure
The state and city should take actions to
prevent North Las Vegas from financial
failure and reneging on any of its fiscal
obligations. A default could result in a
cascading disaster that impacts the region’s
fiscal capacity and business reputation. The
current estimate is that the city will see a $32
million short fall in next year’s budget
(beginning July 1, 2012). There is also a
concern that the city lacks liquidity to meet
immediate commitments. The discussions to
remedy this situation have concentrated on
two key areas for savings: union concessions
and service consolidations. Yet there are
problems with both approaches. The unions
are actively resisting any major concessions
and discussions to merge municipal services
with other jurisdictions have broken down
(although there may still be an option for
merging the city prison).
Options that remain viable include massive
layoffs of public employees and some cash
assistance from the state. City officials
recently approved a significant number of
layoffs, and this number may grow depending
on how many voluntary retirements the city
can negotiate and the amount of savings that
produces. The amount of direct resources
that Nevada can offer is limited but creative

options are available. However, the politics of
this assistance are also problematic. The
state cannot be seen as simply bailing out
North Las Vegas. Critics will charge that a
bailout will only encourage other localities to
act in a profligate manner and then demand a
state rescue. Any state assistance needs to be
conditioned on specific reforms that reduce
municipal expenditures in the future. While
the state is certainly cash strapped, it does
have some modest resources available to
assist North Las Vegas. In fact, revenue is
running a bit ahead of estimate and the state
also holds new resources that may be
available to help address this crisis.
Nevada will receive tens of millions of dollars
as part of a 49 state $25 billion settlement
with major banks in a lawsuit resulting from
unlawful foreclosures. Approximately $20
billion in these funds will go directly to
impacted consumers in an effort help avoid
foreclose. The other $5 billion will go to the
states, with a third of that money targeted to
about 750,000 households that were illegally
foreclosed on who will now receive $2,000
checks each. The State of Nevada is slated to
receive $57.4 million under the settlement.
The distribution of the money is directed by
the state’s attorney general, although there is
nothing to prevent the money from being
swept into Nevada’s general fund. The
intention is to use these resources to prevent
future foreclosures via programs such as
consumer counseling. North Las Vegas is
eligible for funding as it is currently
structured, provided that the city applies the
funds in specific programmatic areas
determined by the attorney general.

There may be some flexibility in helping the
city more directly. The politics are dicey, but
Nevada leaders from both parties have
demonstrated a newfound willingness to
work together. The state’s new economic
development plan, Unify, Regionalize,
Diversify: An Economic Development Agenda
For Nevada 6, a blueprint for restructuring
economic development and diversification
across the state, is one bipartisan example.
Nevada political leaders from both parties
could support a plan to designate a portion of
the funds noted for municipalities impacted
by the foreclosure crisis. The state could also
leverage these funds by creating a revolving
loan fund to assist localities that have cash
flow problems. The bottom line is that the
Nevada’s leaders need to think creatively and
determine the best use of this windfall
resource in order to protect any locality from
long‐term economic failure.
The weeks ahead are perilous for North Las
Vegas and the state. The best case is for both
to act in cooperation and to be flexible in this
crisis in order to avoid an actual economic
failure. The politics are difficult. The
perception that the city deserves to fail is
palpable. Cooler heads must prevail. The
state can ill afford for North Las Vegas to
become a symbol for an enduring decline in
Nevada. That negative public image is in no
one’s interest, including the city’s harshest
critics.
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